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PRIVATE LETTERS
ON THE
EASTERN QUESTION,

WRITTEN AT THE DATES THEREON,

(FIRST PUBLISHED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION)

BY

VISCOUNT PONSONBY.
"

A REPRINT,

WITH AN ADDITIONAL LETTER.

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MDCCCLIV.

The Letters, written to a friend, and solely for the purpose of conveying to him my opinions, may possibly be of some small use if made known more publicly—much in them having been verified, as will be evident when their respective dates are noticed. The truth of the past is often some guide for the conduct of present affairs.



[COPY.]

November 17, 1853.

MY DEAR LORD,—

The great interest I take in the Eastern Question impels me to write oftener than I otherwise should do. I have seen in the newspapers an article extracted from the journal edited by Mons. De la Guéronnière, who is, as I am told, supposed to speak often the opinion or views of Napoleon. In that article there is *assumed* that the Mediatorial Powers (what he calls Europe) have a right to establish a Peace ;—that is, to determine the terms upon which Russia and Turkey shall conclude the War.

I will not attempt to obtain your attention

to what I could say for the purpose of exhibiting the *absurdity* of the doctrine set up ; but I will say that, if it shall be applied in the case adverted to above, it will be an act of flagrant injustice to Turkey.

The French and English Governments have been engaged to mediate, because they were bound, by *treaty*, to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman territory,—to which treaty the Russians were a party. The Russians violated that treaty by the occupation of the Ottoman territory, in order to force the Sultan to concede certain things demanded by the Russians. The French and English Governments made propositions for the establishment of peace, which were rejected by Russia in one instance, by Turkey in the other, and by Russia at a subsequent period. The Mediators did not pretend to have a right to enforce upon the Russians or upon the Turks the acceptance of such an arrangement as may suit the Mediators. That would be, in the first place, an arbitrary despotic act of power, and a principle, if admitted, which would *justify* the coercion that a strong State might think fit to employ against a weaker. It would, in the next place, be an act of extreme partiality to the Russians and of oppression exercised as

to the Turks. The latter have been assailed with a military force by the Russians, without even a pretext that has borne a colour of right ; they have been forced to defend themselves, and war has ensued.

Every writer upon International Law declares, that a war puts an end to treaties between the belligerents — the treaties by which Russia has from time to time emasculated Turkey. Will the Mediators force the Sultan to reanimate those destructive Treaties wrested formerly from the weakness of the Turks, and made for the purpose of ensuring the continuation of that weakness, so as to enable Russia to repeat her aggressions ? Will France and England combine to *force* the Sultan to forego the *use* of the advantages he may have obtained by the valour of his troops, and skill of his generals, and devotion of his subjects ? Will France and England force him whom they call Ally to reinstate his enemy in the possession of those territorial possessions* which have been so lately notoriously used to favour attack upon him ? Will France and England, under the disguise of love for peace, replace in the hands of Russia, territories which will facilitate a re-

* See note (a) at the end.

newal of attempts at conquest, and, therefore, be a constant excitement to that very thing, war, which France and England profess to hinder? Supposing that Ottoman armies should be able to drive the Russians from Bessarabia, would France and England forbid the Sultan from repossessing himself of that frontier which formerly fortified his Empire, and which later events have proved to be almost necessary for its safety? Will France and England force the Sultan to break the treaties he has *now* made with the Circassians, and other people in and about the Circassian country? Will France and England force the Ottomans not to use the fleet which by their skill and foresight they have created to supply the loss which England inflicted upon them at Navarino; and forbid the employment of that arm where, if used, it MAY be found superior to the fleet of Russia (their mortal enemy)? Will France and England insist upon the re-establishment of the prohibition of the passage of the *Bosphorus* to *ships* of war, by which the Black Sea was made a sort of peculium for Russia? And, to conclude, I will ask, will France and England again believe in the faithful performance of treaties by the Russians? The world will not credit such a

thing. The world will think that the Governments of France and England have in view other ends than the one that is asserted to be theirs—*Peace*.

Ever yours,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

[COPY.]

Saturday, 19th November.

MY DEAR LORD,—

I pointed out for your observation the article written by De la Guéronnière, Editor of the *Constitutionnel* and the *Pays*. I see the same doctrine is taken up *substantially* by the *Times*. I presume, therefore, that it is to be adopted by the Ministers. I beg you will take it into your consideration. I think you will, on examination, be of my mind respecting it; that, at least, you will agree with me in part of what I have written to you on the

point. I propose now to offer an observation or two in addition.

You speak of the danger of a rising in Poland if the Turks are successful against the Russians. You can tell me if there exists a *Polish army*,—and, if there is such a thing, how it is to be officered. The last Revolution was made by the army, which had been formed in a great measure by Constantine, but was truly Polish. That Revolution was put down by the FOLLY of the people of Warsaw, with their Clubs, and all the other usual nonsense of Democratic Revolutionists. The army was damaged most essentially by the destruction of the *unity* of power of command; and when the crisis came, the people were, as always is the case, *nul*.

I think the question, then, is—Is there a Polish army that will, or will not, oppose the Russians? If the plans, which I believe to be now in contemplation, shall be carried into effect, and force shall be used to put down the Turks in order to protect the Russians, then, most certainly, the Turks will do their best to raise rebellion in Poland, and in Hungary also. It will be the interest of the Turks to do so. If the Turks are allowed to enjoy their right to support their own

cause, they will have no interest in raising up revolutionary party in Poland or in Hungary. If the Turks gain by conquest the possession of those portions of their ancient territory which the Russians have in later times wrested from them, they may be in a state of security which will induce and enable them to be the zealous friends of peace, and perfectly without motives for disturbing their neighbours. If the plan of coercion is carried into effect, the interest of the Turks will be to disturb those neighbours. What their means may be, I do not mean to enquire now. The plan is a foul breach of justice and law ; it is also an act of treachery. We must be *dupes* to enter into it ; and, as sure as God made Moses, the British Ministers who are guilty of such an act will be made by the country to suffer for the deed.

Yours ever,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

[COPY.]

November 29th, 1853.

I write because I have something I like to talk about, and also because you desired me to write upon the subject (worn out though it be) of the Turkish affairs. I am not deceived by what I read in the *Times*, and also in some other journals. The Mediating Powers are occupying themselves still in the mockery of a search for peace that shall *be* permanent, and based upon *their* mediation, *id est*, their *dictation*. Whoever has eyes to read what has been written as the records of the efforts made by the aforesaid Statesmen must be fully aware that a peace so made must be *one to please* the *Russian Emperor*.

Every man who is not wholly ignorant of Turkey, of Russia, and of Europe generally, will see that such a peace will be the forerunner of a war which will produce the very evils which our wise men of Gotham make it their pride to prevent. I mean a war in which the *revolutionary* principles will be called into action. A peace that shall dissatisfy Turkey and do injury to that country, will force the adoption by the Ottoman Government of a policy that

otherwise would be contrary to the interest of the Sultan.

The Turks are too much excited, they are too far advanced in the *patriotic* defence of their country to concur fairly and truly in any arrangement that shall not contain in it *security* against future attacks, and the, obvious to them, danger of leaving in the hands of the Russians those territories which have enabled Nicholas to carry into effect his known, —I might say, acknowledged,—design to seize upon the Empire.

No Turk will ever again trust in the aid of Allies ; he will look to his own means, and he will not be scrupulous as to the nature of them, when he shall have palpable proof that he *cannot trust* those who have professed to be his friends, and have said that their *own interest* engaged them to be so. The means to which the Turks will naturally resort will include the encouragement by them, of every party in Poland, in Hungary, in Austria, in Italy, in France. How much the Turks may be able to effect in that way it is not for me to say, but I think it will be more than can be agreeable to any of the other Governments.

Now, with respect to the Russians, I cannot see even the slightest *possibility* of any such

result from a fair and reasonable arrangement of the matter in a way displeasing to Nicholas. No Liberal, no revolutionary partisan, will raise, or endeavour to raise up a disturbance against those who have opposed *his* views of conquest. They, on the contrary, will be gratified by his failure, rather than excited to aid or to avenge him. If he shall be weakened by this failure of his plans against Turkey, he *may* be attacked in Poland; but that attack would not, by any means, necessarily involve us or Europe in the conflict. The Hungarian mountebanks, like Kossuth, might exult and make a noise; but Austria need have no fear of that. There would be *Newspaper Insurrections* in Italy. The power of France, under the influence of Napoleon, would be fully sufficient to keep down all really demagoguish movements, that had no more solid *support* than the *intrigues* of disappointed *intriguers*, or foolish philosophers. But give to the mass of ambitious malcontents a substratum, such as the natural and national discontent of the Turkish *Government* and *People*, and those who in their scattered state must be physically feeble, might, having a head and a growing nucleus, become formidable.

Reinstate Russia in her possession of those

itorial *positions*, by *means* of which the present political crisis was prepared, and let those means, as they certainly would do, excite the Russian Chief to return to the pursuit of his object, he would not be stopped by his present check: he would not hesitate to *sin again*. "Repentance is but want of power to sin." The Russian Emperor will soon recover a slight wound. He should be disabled, and such real security be obtained by Turkey as to make him impotent for the gratification of his passions.

Suppose, however, that by pursuing the policy in fashion with our Ministers, that Russia shall be placed in a position, sooner or later, to acquire the object of the Russian ambition. What would be the consequence? Would not all Europe be engaged in war to resettle the balance of power upon some more safe basis? Would Europe leave Russia in possession of the Ottoman Empire, or of the Ottoman city, Constantinople? I say, no; France would not submit to it; even Austria could not, though that Emperor should have originally shared the prey with Russia. An English Minister, indeed, and his Cabinet might yield to the fear of war, but the English nation would not.

I conclude. The present pusillanimity is the promoter of danger ; it is the fosterer of shame ; it is the offspring of ignorance ; it has disgraced the country in the eyes of other nations. No one can afford to be hated unless he be feared.

Yours ever,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

[COPY.]

Monday, December 19, 1853.

MY DEAR LORD,—

The *Times* having made some hypothetical remarks, continues thus: "But if no movement of the fleets had taken place, the Porte may be rendered more amenable to the counsels of its Allies by the strong probability that it can neither command the Black Sea, nor hold its ground by land without their support."

This clearly exhibits the desire that the Turks may be forced to submit to such terms of peace as the Allies may think fit to impose upon them. It would be ridiculous to expect

that our Ministers would pretend to impose terms upon the Emperor of Russia. They are for coercing the weak and yielding to the strong. The Romans took pride in the contrary : "*Parcere subjectis debellare superbos*" suited their taste. English Ministers, having with them the support of France, are afraid of the Emperor of Russia ! This is a triumph indeed for our French rivals. The exhibition of what England is made to appear to be is worth much to Napoleon. He cannot be classed, in fact, with his Allies. The world is too well acquainted with facts for that.

Picture for yourself the result of the success of this Ministerial plan, if it shall succeed. Russia victorious over England and France, ostensibly combined to keep their treaties from violation ; both of them professing to see that the material interests of the two countries are deeply concerned in the security of the Turkish Empire ; knowing that the Russian Government has repeatedly attacked it, to obtain more territory, before this last act of spoliation was attempted under hypocritical pretences ; knowing, also, that the Emperor has always professed one thing with regard to Turkey and *done* the contrary ; knowing that our fear is now the cause of this ; and imagine any ground upon which a man, endowed even

with common understanding, can believe that any treaty that will be made by the Allies for the establishment of peace between Russia and Turkey *can be secure!* If the Sultan shall be forced to it, the triumph of Russia will be *over England*, and, to a certain degree, over France, though it is well known that the latter was willing and ready to take a bold and honest part at the first moment of the Russian aggression.

Who will hereafter believe in the wisdom, the courage, or the honesty of the British Government? Who can fail to see that Russia will be encouraged to repeat her assaults by the certainty that the terror she inspires into English Ministers will at any future time enable her to rob as well as to bully with success?

I flatter myself that many voices will be raised in the House of Lords to make known to the world the truths I have here stated to you. I believe that even my own, most insignificant as it is, would be sufficient to do it. I am sure that our countrymen are *not* poor-spirited enough, and sordid lovers of economy (as it is miscalled) to a degree that will make them approve of what has been done.

Ever yours,

(Signed)

PONSONBY.

[COPY.]

December 24th, 1853.

MY DEAR LORD,—

Were I to remain silent respecting the Eastern Question you would imagine me to be forced by illness to do so ; and, knowing that such an idea would be unpleasant to you, I write to prove that I am not incapacitated by any ailment.

The subject itself has an intrinsic importance that makes it less dull than it would be, in consequence of its never-ceasing discussion by friends and foes ; for it is one, the treatment of which *in action*, will affect the basis upon which the political state of the world has rested.

I am aware that what I have just said is very common-place declamation ; but it is true. I maintain that if the plans of the Governments of England and Austria *succeed*, Europe will have no peace to rejoice in for years to come. The plan, as it is developed in the proceeding of the Mediatorial Conferences, and published under date 5th December, is in substance the *preservation to Russia of all those territories* which Russia held in virtue of treaties, which treaties are now abrogated by

the *existence of war* between Russia and Turkey. It is a plan to *force* the Sultan to accept a state of vassallage, to break faith with his allies in Asia, to *disgust* all his most faithful subjects, and to deprive himself of a chance of future resistance to the will of Russia.*

The plan springs from *treachery*, or from namby-pamby nonsense, or *gross ignorance*. I have not said that Napoleon will carry it into execution ; I feel confident that he will *not*. He has too much sense, too much taste, too much courage, too much knowledge of politics to take such a part.

I expect to hear shortly that he has engaged in hostilities against the Russians. He must well know that *we* will not *dare* to thwart his will, though we may run away ! I am shocked by the things I hear said by quiet men.

There is a way, and I think it is a likely one, to get England out of the filth in which she is attempted to be smothered. I *expect* that fortune will save her by making a war break out between her and Russia in *spite of the British Government*. Events already have defeated more than half of the schemes and practices engaged in by that Government. Every body sees through the flimsy

* See note (b) at the end.

covering used by them to disguise paralytic tremors.

The Absolutist, the Aristocrat, the Constitutionalist, the Radical, and the Chartist, all turn up the nose with expression of scorn at the enormous folly as well as at the immeasurable meanness of conduct exposed in the sayings and doings of the last eight months.

I will repeat the substance of a part of one of my former letters to you. I ask, does any man believe that there will be re-established a *durable* state of things if Russia shall again be entitled to act in pursuance of her old treaties with Turkey? Can any one give credit to the engagements that may be entered into by England, or by France, or Austria, or Prussia, to *make* Russia in future observe her promises? Has not the *world seen* that those who still perhaps call themselves the Allies of the Sultan have equivocated, quibbled, and tricked during many months to *avoid* keeping their plighted faith? Is it not palpably true that those Powers have asserted *their* right to compel the Sultan to make peace upon such conditions as those *soi disant* Allies think it for their *own* interest to establish?

Will not treachery and violence such as have been talked of seriously by the Allies,—aye, and,

in a certain degree, enacted by them,—be reasonably and justly expected to be again practised? Will anybody, in any country, confide in any, even the most solemn engagements?

Force alone. The strong hand will operate, and the fine lovers of peace have to trust to the sword alone. This may be too much the nature of things. I grieve to think that it is so.

Ever yours,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

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[COPY.]

December 30th, 1853.

MY DEAR LORD,—

With respect to your views of the great affair of the East, I am of opinion, as I always have been, that the exhibition of any vigour in the commencement would have placed that affair in an intelligible state, instead of its falling into inextricable confusion from our shilly-shally conduct.

Had we taken manfully the part which



our honour and our engagements and our national interest called upon us to adopt, we in that case should have had ground to call upon the Turks to defer to our views in the settlement of the quarrel ; but, as things have been conducted, I think the Turks were in no wise bound to trust to our direction as to the terms of peace.

The Turks saw the most unequivocal evidence of our *fears* of Russia : they saw in every one of our acts the plain manifestation of our desire to avoid risking the displeasure of Russia. The Turks had, as now they have in a still more palpable form, a clear knowledge that we were ready and disposed to sacrifice the most important interests of the Ottoman Empire in order that a war we so much dreaded might be avoided. The *feelings* of the Turkish people directed their national action. The natural and honest impulses directed them to take a part, as much wiser in my opinion, as it was more honourable in the estimation of every man I have heard speak of it, than all the *finesse* of diplomacy. The going forward a little,—the going back a little,—the *dodging* of our diplomacy exhibited to the world the fact that we were afraid of Russia.

I am certain that had we not been resisted by the common sense of the Turks, we should have made the ruin of their Empire inevitable. I am sorry that the Turks have yielded, as I am told they now have done, to any proposition made by us for negotiation. I think that if they, the Turks, are *drawn* in to trust England, they will ultimately be ruined. *My* hope is (and a very strong hope), that *Nicholas*, elated by his obvious triumph over England—exhibited to the world in the public acts of that country—may refuse or evade *even such terms* as the English Government must, from mere shame, *now* propose to him.

Let the Allies, as they call themselves, *withdraw* their fleet. Let them leave to Turkey and to Russia to fight the battle out: the Turks will gain. They will not be defeated by Russia. They will not be forced to restore the treaties through which Russia has obtained the advantages against Turkey, which have been so mischievous; but it would be better for Turkey to undergo any defeat than to submit to English diplomacy.

I know something of the real available force of the Russians; and I know something of the intrinsic force of the Ottoman Empire,

now that the people of that country are aware for what it is that they have to fight.

The records of the Russian campaigns in 1828 and 1829 are not waste papers for me. I know also, from an authority which it is *impossible* to doubt, that enormous as were the losses enumerated in the report of the Prussian General which you have seen, that the *real* loss experienced by the Russians in those campaigns was *greater* than so reported.

I do not discuss the question of Turkey. I seek only to express my own opinions when I advert to the immense importance of this Eastern question to the interest of England, and of the coming times of Europe.

The dispute between Russia and the Porte is, whether or not the Russians should be masters of the best part of the world. I look at the condition of things in this light, and I am convinced that the policy adopted by the Allies is the straight way to the establishment of Russia in that position.

I think that England is the country that will be the greatest loser in power, and that what we all know of the Russian means and **ENDS** in Asia fully shews the fact.

I am certain that English Ministers, and the French also, as it appears, are ready to

assume the right to dictate the terms of peace; and what those terms will be is to me indubitable—that is, the real effectual dependence of Turkey upon the will of Russia.

I have no faith in, or respect for the conduct of the Allies. I have seen them from the first to the last of their proceedings in the Eastern Question act under the influence of *petty* views, of supposed present advantages, and in no case looking at the true nature of the affair. I have seen them *support* the robber in the work of attacking the weaker person, of whom those Allies were the self-elected guards. Like a false trustee, they have permitted the robbery of the man whose possession of the estate they were bound to defend.

Ever yours,

(Signed)

PONSONBY.

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[COPY.]

February 17th, 1854.

SIR,—

I think it would not be lost time if you would employ a few minutes in looking at the first article in the *Journal des Débats*\* of this day, the 17th. The article is headed "Paris, 16 Février." You will there see what is assumed to be an opinion of the Prussian Government, and also an opinion in France, the purport of which is, that the Allies, having served and saved Turkey from Russia, the Allies should exact from Turkey remuneration for their services; and the proposed remuneration seems to be some arrangements made for the

\* *Journal des Débats*, February 16, 1854.—Extract: After having applauded the French despatch addressed to le Comte Moustier, dated the 15th Janvier, 1854, generally, it continues: "La protection que l'Europe Occidentale accorde en ce moment à la Turquie, n'aura pas seulement pour effet de conserver l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman; elle augmentera les garanties que dans le double intérêt de la religion et de l'humanité on doit désirer pour les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan. Jamais non plus le gouvernement Ottoman n'a accepté plus ouvertement l'intervention amicale et civilisatrice des puissances Chrétiennes."

The *Débats* then observes: "Ces paroles sont remarquables; ainsi il y a, pour ainsi dire, deux interventions de l'Occident en Orient, qui doivent se suivre et s'échelonner: l'intervention guerrière pour défendre la Turquie; et quand celle-là aura réussi, l'intervention civilisatrice. Nous nous attachons plus volontiers à la seconde intervention qu'à la première; mais si la première est nécessaire, et si la marche des événements l'impose, la seconde, nous n'en doutons pas, suivra et même accompagnera la première."

After this there comes a long exposition of the principals and maxims of France being "destined to be carried every where where France carries her arms."



further advancement of the Christians of all denominations and sects in the Ottoman Empire. I ask, what is there that can be given to the Christians more than the absolute and uncontrolled exercise of their religion: the total liberation of their various priests, the free existence of convents and monasteries, the security of their Church, and all other things that come under the head of freedom, unless it be power, political power? If power is to be given to the Christians, how are they to be prevented using that power to set up their own authority and to put down that of the Mahometans? Turkey, as you well know, is a sort of popedom, the Sultan is Kaliff; the laws are the Khoran and the commentaries upon that book; and, necessarily, if the authority of the Kaliff and the Khoran, and the Ulema is put down, and another power raised up in its place, the Ottoman Empire will and must be destroyed. This is the way in which I view the article in the *Débats*; and if I am not in error, I would ask what worse could the Russians do for the Turks, than would in that case be the work of their professed friends and saviours?

I will not take up your time by canvassing this point. How could there be got together in Turkey any sufficient number of Christians

who are agreed in the same doctrine ? There are a number of sects differing in a very great degree one from another, and animated by by strong zeal, each in favour of its own opinions, and by a considerable degree of hatred of other sects. The result, I imagine, of such a state of things would be religious disputes, most virulent in their character, and possibly of a war of religion against religion, the necessary interference of other countries, and the subjugation of Turkey by France, or Austria, or Russia, or by some combination for the dismemberment of the country. This assuredly would not be a benefit for Europe, because the final issue could not be arrived at until after a deluge of blood.

I cannot myself conceive anything more mischievous, more foolish, more dishonest than such a project would be if carried into effect ; and yet what I have cursorily read in the *Débats* seems to me to be the recommendation of such a plan of action. We are accustomed to think that the wars of some ages past for the propagation of our religious belief by the destruction of those who had a different belief, was not only a foolish, but a wicked policy ; one that was the basis of the Inquisition, one that was the principle of all the persecutions

that took place in various countries of Europe. Why should not the Catholics of the Romish Church drive the Protestants of the English Church from their power and position and seize for themselves the prey? Why should not the Protestants extirpate the Romanists? The principle is the same.

In the *Times* of the 18th, there is a long article, which looks very much like one intended to support the same idea as this, which prevails in the writing in the *Débats*; from which it may, I fear, be suspected that the British Government is not adverse to such a political act as the demand of remuneration from Turkey for English services rendered, and that the remuneration should be of the nature indicated in the *Débats*.

Assuming the carrying into effect the supposed plan, it may be imagined that internal disputes in Turkey would lead to internal war, and internal war to foreign interference within the territory; such interference would create jealousies; each Power would look to the possession of security against the aggrandisement of some other Power, and it is probable that universal war might be the result.


Yours, sincerely,

(Signed) PONSONBY.



(a) The Province of Bessarabia is extremely fertile. It produces corn in such abundance that, after all the wants of its inhabitants are supplied, there is still enough of it left to furnish an immense supply for the English market. Bessarabia is also enabled by its situation to carry on a vast commerce, if freed from artificial obstacles to it. The Danube traverses it and falls into the sea by its several mouths at its southern extremity. That great River is called the Artery of Germany, and deserves the appellation. The Province was obtained in 1812 by the Russians, and they engaged by treaty to keep open that mouth by which the Danube furnishes the means for transporting goods to the sea. The Russians have certainly *neglected* to keep that channel clear; and it is said that they have contributed to its present ill condition, instead of to its preservation in a fit state for commerce. If Bessarabia shall be restored to the dominion of the Sultan, it will be *his* direct and great interest to keep the course and ingress of the Danube to the sea in the best possible state, and to favour in every way the foreign commerce of the country for the benefit of Turkey, and Europe generally, and England in particular. The Province and the River may, therefore, be safely left in Turkish hands, and the interest of general commerce will be advanced. The political interests that demand the *re-transfer* of Bessarabia to the dominion of the Sultan are of the first magnitude. They are intimately united with the *European necessity* for the establishment of the future security of the Ottoman Empire against the ambitious projects of Russia. Bessarabia, with its natural boundary to the East, forms a strong frontier for Turkey to resist a foe, and if in the hands of Russia affords facile means for the promotion of the conquest of Turkey by Russia. Policy demands that Bessarabia be restored to the dominion of the Sultan.

(b) The Earl of Clarendon having since made his explanatory speech in the House of Lords, in which he declared that the Government is determined *to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire*, I presume that His Lordship meant, the Ottoman Empire as it was composed at the time last year when the Principalities were invaded by the Russians: no other date can be taken. This being the case, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire which is to be maintained may imply, in fact, the restoration to Russia of those territories enjoyed by that Power in virtue of Treaties which have been rendered null and void by war, unless Lord Clarendon's declaration is to be limited to the expression of his determination that the integrity of the Empire shall be maintained, whatever may be the reverses or defeats of the Turks. But if it should mean that, let the result of the war be a peace, in consequence of successes obtained against Russia, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be defined, as above, and maintained by the Allies, the consequences of that policy may be such as to produce great evil, and, therefore, it is now desirable to obtain an answer to the question proposed.





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